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The Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission has focused legal analysts and lawmakers on campaign finance
disclosure for at least two reasons.1 First, the constitutional invalidity of
campaign expenditure restrictions, and the limited efficacy of campaign
contribution limits, has left campaign finance disclosure as one of the few
generally applicable tools available to regulate money in politics. Second,
the Court’s broad opinion, as sweeping in its approval of campaign finance
disclosure as it is in its disapproval of campaign expenditure restrictions,
conceals disclosure’s surprisingly weak doctrinal and policy foundations.
Prompted by a new wave of reforms and legal challenges, analysts are
reexamining the practical costs and benefits of, and the constitutional basis
for, campaign finance disclosure.2
Assistant Professor, University of Montana School of Law. Thanks to Michael Gilbert
and Adrian Vermeule for helpful clarifications and comments, to Samir Aarab for editorial and
research assistance, and to my family for their support.
1. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). The author served as
counsel of record for 26 states as amici curiae in the case.
2. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Campaign Finance Disclosure 2.0, 9 ELECTION L.J. 273, 303
(2010) (arguing that disclosure “needs to be reformulated in light of modern communications
technology, the extremist strain in contemporary political discourse, and a better
understanding of just how disclosed information is used by the voters and can be used to
educate the public”); Richard L. Hasen, Chill Out: A Qualified Defense of Campaign Finance
Disclosure Laws in the Internet Age, 27 J.L. & POL. 557, 572–73 (2012) (“In the post-Citizens United
era . . . mandated disclosure can serve the important interest in deterring corruption and
providing valuable information to voters.”); Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Disclosures About Disclosure, 44
IND. L. REV. 255, 257 (2010) (addressing, in part, “whether the existing disclosure and
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Michael Gilbert’s article, Campaign Finance Disclosure and the Information
Tradeoff,3 is a productive contribution to this recent reconsideration of
campaign finance disclosure. The article reevaluates the net informational
consequences of campaign finance disclosure. This reevaluation balances
both the Citizens United majority’s confidence that “transparency enables the
electorate to make informed decisions and give proper weight to different
speakers and messages,”4 and the fear in Justice Thomas’s dissent that
“disclosure requirements enable private citizens and elected officials to . . .
prevent the lawful, peaceful exercise of First Amendment rights.”5 As
Professor Gilbert observes, this balancing approach is necessary now because
the underdeveloped state interest in informing the electorate “has become a
critical fault line in the debate” over campaign finance disclosure.6 Shifts in
the informational consequences of a disclosure rule may determine the
rule’s practical efficacy and constitutional validity. As the Court in Citizens
United suggested, the relative strength of that informational interest turns on
whether or not disclosure would help voters “make informed choices in the
political marketplace.”7 The question is more difficult than it seems, and
Professor Gilbert’s “information tradeoff” model proposes a better way to
answer it.
This Essay considers Professor Gilbert’s model as the core element in a
dynamic system of campaign finance disclosure. First, it recognizes several
useful contributions of the model’s framework of informational costs and
benefits. In the simplest analysis, disclosure increases the information
available to voters by adding source revelation to campaign speech.
However, the reality is more complicated. Disclosure can have a chilling
effect that decreases the amount of campaign speech by imposing
administrative and exposure burdens on speakers. As Professor Gilbert
shows, this cannot end the analysis. What matters is not just the magnitude
of the chilling effect on speech, but the net “information tradeoff” between
the decrease in campaign speech and the increase in source revelation, both
of which are informative to voters.8 Moreover, disclosure can “thaw” speech
because source revelation sometimes increases the expected value of speech

disclaimer rules result in more informed voters and if they do not, whether any disclosure and
disclaimer regime would be more likely to accomplish this goal”). For the author’s examination
of these issues in more depth, see Anthony Johnstone, A Madisonian Case for Disclosure, 19 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 413, 416 (2012) (suggesting several “more focused means of disclosure for
individuals, organizations, ‘foreign’ campaign participants, and issue advocacy”).
3. Michael D. Gilbert, Campaign Finance Disclosure and the Information Tradeoff, 98 IOWA L.
REV. 1847 (2013).
4. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 371.
5. Id. at 483.
6. Gilbert, supra note 3, at 1851.
7. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 369.
8. Gilbert, supra note 3, at 1852.
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to a speaker, thereby encouraging some speech that would not otherwise
occur.9
Second, this Essay builds upon the information tradeoff in several
directions, drawing on other scholars’ perspectives of campaign finance as a
complex system of dynamic interactions. It refines the speaker’s cost-benefit
function in the information tradeoff at the level of the individual disclosure
rule, extends the information tradeoff analysis to dynamics involving
multiple individual disclosure rules at the regime level, and considers the
aggregate information tradeoff from multiple interacting regimes at the
system level. The Essay concludes by suggesting that, given the difficulty of
determining the information tradeoff at the rule, regime, and system levels,
analysts, policymakers, and courts should more often recognize the value of
second-best solutions to campaign finance disclosure.
I.

THE INFORMATIONAL COSTS AND BENEFITS OF DISCLOSURE

Professor Gilbert focuses on the informational costs and benefits of
campaign finance disclosure from the listener’s perspective. He takes into
account the speaker’s calculation of whether or not to speak under a
particular disclosure rule.10 Gilbert’s model makes three critical and
contestable assumptions about what kind of information matters most in
politics. Each assumption takes a strongly democratic, voter-centered view of
political discourse.
First, the model assumes the total amount of information available to
individual voters is the proper object of maximization in the information
tradeoff. This does not deny the importance of intermediaries and other
elites. It does, however, discount the value of information available only to
those elites, using a simple approximation of the overall level of information
available to both voters and elites. Second, Gilbert’s model assumes that
from a voter’s perspective, source revelation serves as an imperfect
informational substitute for campaign speech itself. Because of
simplification and distortions, the substantive importance of campaign
speech can be overstated. Meanwhile, cues such as source revelation are
significantly informative to the extent that voters can consider the source of
speech and discount the value of the message based on the identity of the
messenger. Third, it equates contributions and expenditures as “speech
acts,” which are similarly valued in terms of the speaker’s expression of
campaign speech and the listener’s interest in source disclosure.
Based on these assumptions, the article makes two primary claims
challenging conventional wisdom that campaign finance disclosure informs
voters and chills speech. First, any disclosure rule can create an “information
tradeoff” between the source information revealed by the disclosure and the
9.
10.

Id. at 1853.
Id. at 1852.
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substantive message communicated by the speaker. This occurs whenever
the disclosure rule chills speech by a speaker for whom the administration
and exposure costs of revealing source information outweigh the policy
benefits of communicating the substantive message. Second, some
disclosure rules can “thaw speech” by marginally increasing speakers’
expected benefits relative to the cost of disclosure. This may occur either by
increasing the value of the intended policy benefits, or by increasing the
probability that the speech will result in those benefits. Disclosure can
increase the probability of a benefit to a speaker by revealing to the speaker
the supporters of a candidate, which may facilitate an assessment of the
candidate’s credibility on the issue relevant to those supporters.
This same assessment could be performed by a speaker deciding
whether to oppose a candidate based on disclosure of a candidate’s
supporters. For example, a candidate’s promise to adopt a policy addressing
climate change may be more credible if disclosed supporters are
environmental advocates and less credible if disclosed supporters are coal
producers. The credibility assessment runs both ways and can create a
feedback loop in which the candidate uses disclosure to assess the credibility
of supporters’ promises to support the candidate or opponents’ threats to
oppose the candidate. This can encourage the supporters or opponents to
speak and ensure the candidate delivers or takes back the promised policy.
In these ways campaign finance disclosure that increases candidate or
speaker credibility can encourage campaign speech. It also can decrease
candidate or speaker credibility and thereby discourage campaign speech,
but for a reason unrelated to any “chilling” effect from disclosure.
In addition to credibility, disclosure also can clarify the substance of a
candidate’s policies. For example, a candidate that has made no promise on
climate change policy may still have disclosed supporters or opponents that
indicate the candidate’s likely policy. Here, disclosure increases the perceived
probability or value of a benefit to the speaker. It facilitates the speaker’s
discovery of a candidate’s credibility or policies but not an actual change in
the candidate’s inherent credibility or policies. Still, the expected benefit
materializes, and the campaign speech occurs, only when it exceeds the
speaker’s cost of disclosure. If the speaker’s cost of disclosure exceeds the
speaker’s perceived benefit from speech, that speaker’s speech is chilled. In
economic terms, disclosure can make campaign finance more efficient, for
better or worse.11 It can provide information about candidate credibility and
policy that encourages campaign speech (or other analogous campaign
transactions like contributions) from speakers that recognize an expected
benefit only because of the information campaign finance disclosure reveals.

11. Disclosure might also facilitate a candidate’s corruption by clarifying the stakes presented
by a threat of bribery or extortion. This might enable coercion of a candidate to change policy. Yet
transparency also increases the likelihood that corruption will be discovered.
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II. DISCLOSURE AS A SYSTEM
Examining system effects can help to illuminate and extend Professor
Gilbert’s analysis. Whether a given disclosure rule results in a net increase or
decrease in campaign speech from the listener’s perspective is a function of
the aggregated decisions of all potential campaign speakers under the rule.
A regime that increases the disclosure of information at the level of
individual actors might lead to a reduction in the overall information
available, or vice versa. In the analogous setting of mandatory financial
disclosure, Geoffrey Manne explains how disclosure laws can have the
perverse effect of reducing the overall level of disclosure.12 There is more
than a simple tradeoff in the decision to engage in an act subject to
disclosure. Instead, actors in both financial markets and campaign finance
face a range of transactional options among various informational channels,
each subject to different disclosure rules. When the flow of information
becomes too constricted by the costs of disclosure, and the barriers between
channels are permeable, speakers will divert information flows like water
from more constricted to less constricted channels. This is what Professor
Manne terms the hydraulic theory of disclosure, which “holds that, as
disclosure rules impose costs on behavior subject to disclosure, where
behavior can be altered at a lower cost than the cost of disclosure, disclosure
rules will induce behavioral changes rather than increased information
flow.”13
The terminology echoes the campaign finance literature, wherein
Samuel Issacharoff and Pamela Karlan describe the “hydraulics of campaign
finance reform”: they explain that “[m]oney, like water, will seek its own
level. The price of apparent containment may be uncontrolled flood
damage elsewhere . . . . The money that reform squeezes out of the formal
campaign process must go somewhere.”14 Like the money that purchases
campaign speech, campaign speech itself is subject to hydraulic effects
across a regime of disclosure rules. More broadly, the interaction of costs
and benefits accruing to different actors gives rise to a complex system in
which the aggregate effects of the regime on the whole may differ from the
individual effects of the regime on any component.15

12. Geoffrey A. Manne, The Hydraulic Theory of Disclosure Regulation and Other Costs of
Disclosure, 58 ALA. L. REV. 473, 483 (2007) (arguing that “imposing restrictions on the manner
and content of disclosures may, perversely, have the effect of reducing the overall amount of
disclosure, assuming firms would have disclosed voluntarily anyway,” a warranted assumption
according to Manne).
13. Id. at 485.
14. Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance Reform, 77
TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1713 (1999).
15. See generally ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE SYSTEM OF THE CONSTITUTION (2011); Adrian
Vermeule, System Effects and the Constitution, 123 HARV. L. REV. 4, 7 (2009).
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This model is worth extending beyond the speaker’s decision whether
or not to speak. Under most campaign finance laws, speakers have more
options than simply a choice of whether to speak. Speakers also can choose
how and what to speak. Professor Gilbert hints at these effects when he notes
that some disclosure rules, “by chilling some speech acts and thawing
others, . . . might change not only the amount of speech that takes place but
also the character and content of the speech.”16 Yet he disclaims any analysis
of such distributional shifts because they may require “making explicit
assumptions about the character of speech under both regimes and
assigning social value to each.”17 However, some analysis of shifts in the
sources and types of information is possible while remaining neutral as to
the relative social value of those sources and types.18 Beyond the interactions
of speakers with a particular disclosure rule, the analysis also could consider
the interaction of disclosure rules across a campaign finance regime and the
interaction of several regimes within a broader system.
With this in mind, the cost-benefit model of disclosure might be
extended into a systems model of campaign finance disclosure. At the core
of this system-level analysis is Professor Gilbert’s tradeoff model. A rule may
set a dollar threshold for contribution disclosure, or a definition for express
advocacy disclosure. At the rule level the information tradeoff between
speech and source revelation occurs within the channel subject to that rule. On
balance the tradeoff dynamic produces a particular amount of information
for voters within that channel. For example, a rule establishing a low dollar
disclosure threshold for campaign contributions may produce more source
revelation information but fewer campaign contribution speech acts, subject
to potential thawing effects. Beyond the rule-level tradeoff dynamic is the
hydraulic dynamic at the regime level, which describes the diversion of
information within the campaign finance system from a channel subject to one
rule to another channel subject to another rule (or no rule at all). A regime may
include a set of rules for different disclosure of contributions and
expenditures, or issue and express advocacy. For example, a disclosure
regime that includes rules establishing a low dollar disclosure threshold for
campaign contributions and a high dollar disclosure threshold for
independent campaign expenditures may divert speech acts (and related
disclosure) from campaign contributions to independent expenditures and

16. Gilbert, supra note 3, at 1889 n.170.
17. Id.
18. After all, the “information tradeoff” makes explicit a substitution of one type of
information (source revelation) for another (speech), and presumes that the substitution is
material to an evaluation of the total amount of speech. The substitution may be imperfect.
Sometimes a single source revelation produced by a disclosure rule may offset fully the
information lost to chilled speech. Other times it may take ten or more source revelations to
offset the information loss. The informational balance depends on the context of the tradeoff.
Thanks to Professor Gilbert for clarifying this point.
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result in more or less information overall. Above the rule-level tradeoff and
regime-level hydraulic dynamics is the system-level dynamic, which describes
information effects on the overall campaign finance regime resulting from
the interaction among a system of channels subject to different rules. A system may
take in the interaction of disclosure regimes for contributions and
expenditures, and issue and express advocacy. For example, from a
disclosure system that includes different regimes governing express advocacy
supporting or opposing candidates, and issue advocacy supporting or
opposing specific legislation, may emerge complex and surprising dynamics
that produce more or less information than the component regimes might
suggest. Together, each of these models can facilitate additional analysis
along the lines of, but beyond, what Professor Gilbert suggests.
A. RULE-LEVEL TRADEOFFS
At the base of the system of campaign finance disclosure is the
information tradeoff that occurs under individual disclosure rules. Consider
the climate change policy example Professor Gilbert uses to introduce the
potential speech-thawing effects of disclosure. In it, a potential speaker who
supports policies to combat climate change is trying to decide which of two
candidates to support. One candidate has not spoken to the issue either way.
In the absence of a public commitment, the speaker seeks to clarify which
policy the candidate will support if elected. The other candidate has
promised to support such policies in the past. Given changes in public
sentiment, however, the speaker is unsure of the candidate’s credibility in
terms of the probability that if elected the candidate will in fact support the
policy. Through disclosure of campaign contribution records, the potential
speaker might be able to verify candidate’s implicit policy commitment, or
the credibility of an expressed policy commitment, using contributors as a
proxy for the candidate’s likely policy position. In cases where disclosure
enables potential contributors to gain enough confidence in a candidate’s
credibility, the increased expected value of the contribution “flips” the costbenefit calculation and the contribution occurs.19 Similarly, disclosure can
change a potential contributor’s assessment of the magnitude of a
candidate’s policy value.20 These effects can reiterate and combine to
complicate the resulting disclosure calculus for speakers.21
In each case the level of speech or contributions is a function of the
expected benefit of the speech or contribution (the underlying policy value
discounted by the credibility of a candidate acting on the policy) and the

19. Gilbert, supra note 3, at 1885.
20. Id. at 1886–87.
21. See Michael D. Gilbert, Disclosure, Credibility, and Speech, 27 J.L. & POL. 627, 636 (2012)
(“Game theory can help untangle strategic interactions like the ones I have described, and
perhaps in the future I or someone else will apply it to this topic.”).
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cost of disclosure. When, due to a disclosure rule, the cost of disclosure
exceeds the expected benefit, the speech is chilled and there is an
information tradeoff, with source revelation by non-marginal speakers
coming at the expense of speech by marginal speakers. Conversely, when the
expected benefit exceeds the cost of disclosure, the speech is thawed, and
there is an information increase; the increase includes the required
disclosure plus the speech that would not have occurred but for the
disclosure occurring under the rule.
Professor Gilbert’s analysis of information tradeoffs draws an analogy to
Judge Learned Hand’s formula for determining liability in negligence.22
Indeed, the three proposed factors to determine whether a disclosure rule
chills or thaws speech roughly parallel the Hand Formula’s probability,
injury, and burden of precaution variables, with candidate credibility, policy
value, and costs of disclosure doing similar work. In a point he raises but
does not develop, Professor Gilbert acknowledges that the cost of disclosure
is risky in terms of the probability that such cost will materialize. As he
explains the basic chilling effect, “[r]ather than endure those risks and costs
[of disclosure], would-be speakers may choose to remain silent.”23 These
risks require that, like the benefit side of the equation, the costs of
disclosure should be discounted. This suggests a minor, but illuminating,
amendment to the basic information tradeoff model at the rule level.
Unlike Professor Gilbert’s novel point that a candidate’s credibility
enters a speaker’s campaign speech function as a discount to the value of
the speech, the doctrine already recognizes the probabilistic nature of
disclosure costs. While administrative and compliance costs are predictable,
what he calls “the fear of exposure”24 is just that—a fear rather than a
certainty. The Supreme Court appears to conduct just such a risk assessment
of probability when it asks, as it does in weighing the constitutionality of a
disclosure rule in Citizens United, “if there were a reasonable probability that
the group’s members would face threats, harassment, or reprisals if
[donors’] names were disclosed.”25 Given how serious an injury exposure
can pose to expressive association, it must be the probability of such injury,
and not the unquestionable gravity of the injury itself, that determines the
cost side of the chilling equation.
This helps explain why the Court discounts the chilling effect claims of
a corporation like Citizens United that “has been disclosing its donors for
years and has identified no instance of harassment or retaliation,”26 while
fully crediting the “specific incidents of private and government hostility”
22. Gilbert, supra note 3, at 1890 (citing United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d
169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947)).
23. Id. at 1855.
24. Id. at 1873.
25. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 367 (2010).
26. Id.
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reflecting pervasive harassment of the Socialist Workers Party.27 More
importantly, the discounted cost analysis lends further structure to the
distinctions between a case like the Proposition 8 supporters who suffered
“random acts of violence directed at a very small segment of the supporters
of the initiative” that did not amount to a cognizable chill,28 and Margaret
McIntyre who suffered no violence but as a lone pamphleteer “on a
controversial issue” was more likely “to precipitate retaliation” than a group
of campaign donors.29 A very small risk of reprisal against any one member
of a large organizational speaker is heavily discounted relative to a more
significant (although unrealized) risk of reprisal against a lone individual
speaker because the latter risk is more likely to have a decisive chilling effect
on the speaker than the former. The different tradeoffs between source
revelation and chilled speech for Proposition 8 supporters and Mrs.
McIntyre are a function of this risk differential.
B. REGIME-LEVEL HYDRAULICS
The aggregation of individual disclosure rules, each governing a single
channel of campaign speech acts, forms a regime that gives rise to hydraulic
effects across channels. In their fruitful critique, The Hydraulics of Campaign
Finance Reform, Samuel Issacharoff and Pamela Karlan argue the futility of
campaign spending limits but generally support disclosure as a means to
promote “vigilance from within the political process.”30 They suggest “[i]f
disclosure is unadorned with the heavy regulatory baggage of limitations, it
might be far less likely to produce evasion” through the kind of hydraulic
processes they describe.31 This reflects an optimism similar to the Supreme
Court in Citizens United, which concluded “[a] campaign finance system that
pairs corporate independent expenditures with effective disclosure has not
existed before today.”32 Both views rely on the simple static model of
disclosure that Professor Gilbert successfully complicates with a more
dynamic model. Campaign speakers can engage in the same cost-benefit
weighing of disclosure as campaign spenders use in responding to
contribution and spending limits. Just as spenders in a regime of diverse
spending rules governing different channels will factor diversion of
spending from one channel to another in their cost-benefit calculation, so
too will speakers. This suggests that Professor Issacharoff’s and Professor
Karlan’s hydraulic model too narrowly focuses on spending limits to the

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Brown v. Socialist Workers ’74 Campaign Comm. (Ohio), 459 U.S. 87, 99 (1982).
ProtectMarriage.com v. Bowen, 599 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1217 (E.D. Cal. 2009).
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 355 (1995).
Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 14, at 1737.
Id.
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 370 (2010).
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exclusion of source disclosure,33 and that Professor Gilbert’s tradeoff model
could be extended to account for hydraulic effects of disclosure rules.
Recent debates and reform proposals surrounding “dark money”
respond to the hydraulics of campaign finance disclosure. After Citizens
United invalidated corporate expenditure limits, all of the most sophisticated
political players faced no regulatory obstacle to spending unlimited amounts
of funds on campaign speech, at least in terms of spending restrictions.
Money flowed back into previously regulated channels in response to the
Court’s deregulation of campaign finance, a response Professor Michael
Kang calls “reverse hydraulics.”34 Spending rules drive part of this reversehydraulic effect, since some of the new inflow of funding into corporate
campaign actors results from the diversion of limited campaign
contributions to unlimited independent expenditures, as the Issacharoff–
Karlan model predicts. But this account is incomplete without the regimelevel dynamic of differential disclosure rules that divert speech from the
more transparent campaign or political committee contribution channel to
the less transparent independent expenditure channel.
In Professor Gilbert’s model, speakers weigh the costs and benefits of
speech, and will choose to speak when the expected policy benefits outweigh
the expected disclosure costs under a given rule. When the campaign
finance disclosure regime regulates several different speech channels under
several different rules, speakers face more than a binary decision. Instead of
choosing only whether to speak and disclose, a speaker can choose how to
speak and disclose. Choosing among sources of speech, a speaker can
contribute to a candidate’s campaign as a proxy for the speaker’s own
speech, or contribute to a political action committee or other advocacy
organization, or speak directly through an independent expenditure. From
any of these sources, a speaker can expressly support or oppose a particular
candidate or political party, or instead advocate for a particular issue or
specific legislation. Because the benefits from the speech, as well as the costs
of disclosure, vary across these channels of campaign speech, the speaker
may optimize the costs and benefits. A speaker may be able to factor both
the source and the speech as variables in the cost-benefit calculation. Just as
a single disclosure rule influences the amount and mix of information
produced, the regime of disclosure rules influences the amount and mix of
information the regime produces. As the scale of analysis increases from a
rule to a regime of rules, the information tradeoff should take account of
hydraulic effects.
33. In an earlier critique of Professors Issacharoff and Karlan, Michael Kang suggests
more broadly that “[t]he real hydraulics problem is more profound and rises above the
fungibility of money or the specifics of campaign finance,” which “are most often just a subset
category of the hydraulics of party regulation.” Michael S. Kang, The Hydraulics and Politics of
Party Regulation, 91 IOWA L. REV. 131, 149 (2005).
34. Michael S. Kang, The End of Campaign Finance Law, 98 VA. L. REV. 1, 40–52 (2012).
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For example, a rule-based analysis of the information tradeoff from
express advocacy disclosure asks whether voters will be more or less
informed by a rule establishing a low reporting threshold.35 A regime-based
analysis takes account of the contributors’ choice of not just whether to
spend on speech, but also how to spend on speech. Assume that low-dollar
contributions for express advocacy (to a candidate’s campaign, for example)
are moderately valuable to most contributors in terms of expected policy
benefits. In that case, the costs of small-dollar disclosure to most
contributors are slightly less than those benefits, and that disclosure of smalldollar contributors to express advocacy is modestly informative. Most
contributors will not be chilled, and the information tradeoff from the rule
will be positive in terms of both the substantive message of express advocacy
and the source revelation from small-dollar disclosure.
Introduce another rule to the regime for non-disclosure of issue
advocacy, however, and both the speakers’ cost-benefit calculations and the
listeners’ information tradeoff may change. Express advocacy and issue
advocacy are substitutes, even if imperfectly so. The same small-dollar
contribution for issue advocacy (to a politically engaged social welfare
organization, for example) may be less valuable to most contributors in
terms of expected policy benefits. This is because even an issue-based
campaign directly targeted to the relevant policy may be less effective at
achieving the policy than a candidate-based campaign targeted to the
relevant policy maker. Meanwhile, the disclosure costs of such issue advocacy
may fall to zero. A contributor’s net benefit from issue advocacy is greater
than from express advocacy, and the contributor will choose issue advocacy.
Alone, the non-disclosure rule for issue advocacy likely will result in a
positive information tradeoff by avoiding any chill on such speech. This
seems to be the assumption of First Amendment doctrine: robust discussion
of issues provides a big information payoff to the political process that is
easily chilled due to line-drawing and other regulatory problems.36
Taken together as a regime in which hydraulic effects operate, and
maintaining Professor Gilbert’s agnosticism among types of speech for voter
competency purposes, the information tradeoff poses a more complex
question: Does the marginal increase in issue advocacy (speech without
source revelation) offset the marginal reduction in express advocacy (both
speech and source revelation) in a regime containing an issue advocacyexpress advocacy distinction for disclosure purposes? Maybe it does, because
35. Gilbert, supra note 3, at 127 (arguing that small-dollar disclosure is valuable, and the
chilling effect could be minor).
36. See, e.g., Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 467 (2007)
(“After noting the difficulty of distinguishing between discussion of issues on the one hand and
advocacy of election or defeat of candidates on the other, the Buckley Court explained that
analyzing the question in terms ‘of intent and of effect’ would afford ‘no security for free
discussion.’” (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 43 (1976))).
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issue advocacy is nearly as informative to voters as express advocacy, and
source revelation of at least small-dollar contributors is relatively
uninformative. Maybe it does not, because thawing might have a multiplier
effect on express advocacy due to disclosure’s enhancements of credibility or
policy value of a named candidate, such that there is a nonlinear reduction
of speech through the express advocacy channel due to diversion to the
issue advocacy channel.
To elaborate, consider the information tradeoff from introducing a new
disclosure rule for electioneering communications such as the federal law at
issue in Citizens United.37 At the rule level the question is whether the
revelation of sources through disclosure produces a net increase of
information over the expected loss of information through chilling effects.38
The category of electioneering communications is a hybrid of issue and
express advocacy definitions, so the calculations would borrow elements of
both analyses. Electioneering may be more influential than issue advocacy
but less influential than express advocacy, and associated disclosure rules
may produce more source revelation than issue advocacy but less source
revelation than express advocacy.
At the regime level, however, the question becomes whether the overall
mix of information increases as speakers recalculate their cost-benefit
functions and divert speech from some channels to others. As Professor
Kang has argued in a similar context, “[w]hat matters is the regulatory
differential between alternate channels.”39 An electioneering disclosure rule
might be predicted to divert some speech away from express advocacy due to
lower disclosure costs, which might increase the amount of speech but
decrease the amount of source revelation. It might also divert some speech
away from issue advocacy due to its broader coverage that captures
previously undisclosed campaign speech, which might increase the amount
of source revelation but chill speech from issue advocates who wish to
remain undisclosed. As the electioneering channel opens to existing flows of
information (both speech and disclosure) from express and issue advocacy
channels, as well as new inflows of thawed speech and outflows of chilled

37. See 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A) (“The term ‘electioneering communication’ means any
broadcast, cable, or satellite communication which—refers to a clearly identified candidate for
Federal office; is made within—60 days before a general, special, or runoff election for the
office sought by the candidate . . . and in the case of a communication which refers to a
candidate for an office other than President or Vice President, is targeted to the relevant
electorate.”).
38. The analysis could also incorporate the expected gain of information through thawing
effects.
39. Kang, supra note 344, at 43. Professor Kang’s analysis emphasizes money more than
the overall amount of information, and disclosure costs more than speech benefits, but the
dynamic is similar. As he suggests, “[t]his [hydraulic] effect occurs whether the differential
results from increased regulation of one channel relative to another (hydraulics) or from
decreased regulation of one channel relative to another (reverse hydraulics).” Id.
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speech, the total level of information reaches a new equilibrium, distributed
differently across the reconfigured channels. Whether that equilibrium
contains more or less information is a function of the hydraulic information
tradeoff dynamics across rules in the regime.
Acknowledging hydraulic effects at the regime level makes the
information tradeoff model more complex than a rule-level analysis, but also
more useful. A regime-based analysis can get at better answers than asking
about rules alone. Beyond speech-based diversions, hydraulic effects also
produce speaker-based diversions, or even listener-based diversions such as
lobbying.40 These include the diversion of campaign funds from directly
attributed speech by wealthy corporations and individuals into unattributed
proxy speech by 501(c)(4) social welfare organizations and 501(c)(6) trade
organizations, what Professor Gilbert discusses as “disclosure loopholes.”41
These diversions pose the question of whether, in a regime with different
disclosure rules for different speech and different speakers the net effect on
voter information is positive or negative. That is a hard question to answer,
but it is the right question to ask.
C. SYSTEM-LEVEL EFFECTS
Information tradeoffs and the hydraulic metaphor help explain why a
disclosure rule that does increase the production of information at an
individual rule level does not necessarily increase the production of
information when combined with other disclosure rules in a regime. System
effects extend the analysis one step further and help explain why a
disclosure regime that does increase the production of information in
isolation does not necessarily increase the production of information when
combined with other disclosure regimes.
“System effects,” a concept introduced into constitutional analysis by
Professor Adrian Vermeule, “arise either when what is true of the members
of an aggregate is not true of the aggregate, or when what is true of the
aggregate is not true of the members.”42 The information tradeoff reflects
system effects at each level. A rule requiring more information from each
speaker may lead to less information from all speakers. Conversely,
requiring less information from each speaker might produce more
information overall. Here, however, system effects refer to the tertiary
information tradeoffs that occur when rules aggregate to regimes, and
regimes aggregate to an overall campaign finance system. Professor
Vermeule calls this “a system of systems.”43
40. See Richard Briffault, Lobbying and Campaign Finance: Separate and Together, 19 STAN. L.
& POL’Y REV. 105 (2008) (discussing the linkages and interactions between campaign finance
and lobbying as means of influencing the political process).
41. Gilbert, supra note 3, at 1875–76.
42. VERMEULE, supra note 15, at 23.
43. Id. at 27.
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To summarize these dynamics to this point, consider the typical
campaign finance distinction between issue and express advocacy. From a
rule-based perspective, disclosure within each category or channel of speech
suggests a particular information tradeoff. As Professor Gilbert explains, a
rule requiring more disclosure of express advocacy in terms of dollar
threshold, source identification, or manner of reporting will not necessarily
produce more information. Under each rule, considered on its own,
speakers will perform a cost-benefit calculation and will choose to speak only
when the expected benefit exceeds the expected cost. If the benefit exceeds
the cost, the speaker speaks and discloses; if the cost exceeds the benefit, the
speaker is chilled from speaking and does not disclose. Across speakers,
disclosure of other speakers’ campaign activities may thaw speech by making
clearer the benefits (or costs) of supporting or opposing a candidate. We
cannot know if a rule requiring more disclosure produces more or less
information in equilibrium, in terms of the combination of campaign
speech from speakers and source revelation from disclosure, without
understanding the aggregate effect of the information tradeoff resulting
from each speaker’s individual calculation under the rule. Conversely, we
cannot know if a rule requiring less disclosure of issue advocacy produces
less speech without understanding the information tradeoff.
When a regime contains more than one rule, hydraulic effects arise.
Now the speaker’s calculation takes account of how to speak, rather than just
whether to speak. At the regime level, we cannot know whether a particular
set of disclosure rules produces more or less information in equilibrium
without understanding the information tradeoff among all the rules, as well
as within each rule. Speakers will divert their speech between different
channels depending on their individual cost-benefit functions: between
contributions and expenditures, between issue and express advocacy, or
between campaign speech independent of, or coordinated with, candidates.
In a regime that contains one disclosure rule for express advocacy and
another disclosure rule for issue advocacy, understanding the information
tradeoff requires consideration of both rules, including the hydraulic effects
of diversion between the different channels of speech and disclosure.
However, the picture of the information tradeoff is still incomplete.
Campaign finance law is more than a rule or a regime. It is a system—a
system of regimes, regimes of rules. Speakers do not only choose whether to
engage in campaign speech under an express advocacy disclosure rule, for
example. Speakers are not even limited to choosing how to engage in
campaign speech under a regime of different rules for express or issue
advocacy, for example. That disclosure regime interacts with other regimes,
such as those governing contributions and expenditures, and independent
and coordinated campaign speech. We might expand the system to include
other systems like corporate shareholder disclosure under federal securities
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law44 or tax-exempt organization status under federal tax law45 (themselves
each regimes of different rules), or even include the interaction of federal
campaign finance disclosure with state campaign finance disclosure.46 This
suggests both the utility and complexity of the analysis.
Campaign finance law establishes a system of rules for contributions
and expenditures, express and issue advocacy, and independent and
coordinated campaign speech. In such a system, speakers face campaign
speech options ranging from candidate campaign contributions for express
advocacy, to independent expenditures for issue advocacy, and everything in
between. The current federal campaign finance disclosure system, for
example, requires more disclosure for contributions and less for
expenditures, more disclosure for express advocacy and less for issue
advocacy, and more disclosure for coordinated campaign speech and less for
independent campaign speech. In such a system, the speaker will first
calculate the expected policy benefit. For example, the benefit could be
greater for candidate contributions because of increased credibility and
policy value that comes from direct access to the candidate and a clear
message of support. Or the benefit could be greater for independent
expenditures because of more precise issue messaging and the speaker
credibility that comes from the option to threaten opposition as well as
promise support to the candidate. Additionally, each disclosure rule
presents its own administrative and exposure costs, with some channels
presenting easier opportunities to conceal sources than others. Across the
regime, the speaker will divert speech to the set of rules that maximize the
net benefit of the speech to the speaker, assuming it is not chilled. Only the
disclosure required by rules governing the speaker’s chosen speech will be
provided. Due to rule-level chilling and thawing effects, the total
information tradeoff will differ from the sum of the individual speakers’
calculations. Due to regime-level hydraulic effects, the total tradeoff will
differ from the sum of the tradeoffs for each disclosure rule independently.
Due to system-level effects, the total tradeoff may differ from the sum of
equilibria under the regimes.

44. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Shining Light on Corporate Political
Spending, 101 GEO. L.J. 923 (2013) (proposing increased campaign finance disclosure by
corporations under federal securities law); see also Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr.,
Corporate Political Speech: Who Decides?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 83 (2010) (arguing for special rules to
govern who may make political speech decisions on behalf of shareholders).
45. See Ellen P. Aprill, Regulating the Political Speech of Noncharitable Exempt Organizations After
Citizens United, 10 ELECTION L.J. 363 (2011) (examining disclosure and other campaign
finance regulations of tax-exempt organizations under federal tax law).
46. See Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, The $500 Million Question: Are the Democratic and Republican
Governors Associations Really State PACs Under Buckley’s Major Purpose Test?, 15 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. &
PUB. POL’Y 485 (2012) (examining potential state campaign finance disclosure of political
organizations organized under federal tax law, I.R.C. § 527).

JOHNSTONE_PDF_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

158

IOWA LAW REVIEW BULLETIN

2/24/2014 7:54 PM

[Vol. 99:143

Assume the ideal policymaker setting the rules within the system has a
sophisticated view of the information tradeoff and carefully calibrates the
disclosure rules and regimes. Each of the rules produces a net gain of
information, because for most speakers the cost of disclosure is less than the
benefit of speech. Further, each of the regimes produces a net gain of
information, because the net benefits from the disclosure rules for the more
informative types of speech exceed the net benefits from the disclosure rules
for the less informative types of speech. Under this assumption, there would
be little incentive for most speakers to divert speech from one channel to
another to avoid disclosure. The information tradeoff is positive at both the
rule and regime level. Does this system produce more information than a
system that does not comprise regimes and rules with positive information
tradeoffs? In this perfect world, it might. But we cannot be sure without
close examination of the system effects.
At a system level, each rule at each level of the campaign finance
disclosure system must be precisely calibrated to permit any confidence that
the information tradeoff of this system is positive compared to other possible
systems. Any change in a component role by legislative or judicial action, or
any change in the speakers’ evaluation of speech benefits or disclosure costs,
could surprisingly and significantly flip the information tradeoff. The
efficacy of any particular campaign finance disclosure system is contingent
on multiple variables inside and outside the policymaking scope of
government. Any optimal information tradeoff is likely to be elusive and
short-lived given the dynamism of political actors and the inertia of
policymakers.
In reality, the information tradeoffs are mixed and far from optimal.
For example, a court invalidates expenditure limits but upholds
contribution limits, so for some (wealthy) speakers speech through
unlimited expenditures becomes far more valuable than speech through
limited contributions.47 A legislature fails to strengthen disclosure to keep
up with innovations of political actors, so for some (sophisticated) speakers
disclosure of issue advocacy becomes far less costly than disclosure of express
advocacy.48 An agency fails to update coordination rules for contribution
limit and disclosure purposes,49 so for some (connected) speakers quasicoordinated “SuperPAC” and 501(c)(4) speech becomes far more valuable
in terms of unlimited contributions and far less costly in terms of limited
disclosure. Hydraulic effects predominate as wealthy, sophisticated, and
47. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 364–66 (2010); Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 58–59 (1976).
48. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 58–59.
49. See Richard Briffault, Coordination Reconsidered, 113 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 88, 97
(2013) (“[I]t is not surprising that despite the close structural relationship between candidates’
campaigns and their supportive Super PACs there was apparently little or no coordination
within the meaning of the FEC’s regulations in the last election cycle.”).
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connected speakers divert speech into more valuable, less costly channels.
Most other speakers are either chilled or ineffective relative to the highvalue, low-cost diverted speech, and there is relatively little thawing effect
because the diversion results in a lack of disclosure by the most informative
supporters and opponents. The total information tradeoff produces far less
total information than would be produced by the previous system, because
while there is some more speech, there is much less disclosure.
What does a policymaker do to improve the total information tradeoff?
Systems analysis cautions the policymaker who seeks to improve the systemlevel information tradeoff by improving as many regime-level and rule-level
information tradeoffs as is possible. In a system the policymaker should
beware of two fallacies.50 The fallacy of composition is that increasing the
amount of information produced under the various rules necessarily
increases the amount of information produced across the regime or by the
system as a whole.51 The fallacy of division is that increasing the amount of
information produced by the system requires increasing the amount of
information produced under various rules or regimes within the system.52
These fallacies lead to the theory of the second best: “where it is not possible
to satisfy all the conditions necessary for an economic system to reach an
overall optimum, it is not generally desirable to satisfy as many of those
conditions as possible.”53 This means a legislator who seeks to increase the
production of information by requiring more disclosure wherever possible
may decrease the overall production of information. Conversely, a judge
who seeks to increase the production of information by permitting more
speech wherever possible also may decrease the overall production of
information.
Take the campaign finance reformer seeking to improve the
information tradeoff in the post-Citizens United regime of unlimited
independent expenditures by corporations. There is plenty of speech, but a
significant amount of it comes from concealed sources. At the rule level, the
reformer might produce more information under the rule by requiring
more disclosure from corporate speakers who may be less susceptible to
chilling effects than other speakers. At the regime level, the reformer still
may achieve a positive information tradeoff because, even under a reform
increasing disclosure costs, the law prohibits corporations from diverting
speech through coordinated expenditures or contributions, so no hydraulic
effects will occur.54
50. VERMEULE, supra note 15, at 9.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 29–30.
54. See, e.g., United States v. Danielczyk, 683 F.3d 611 (4th Cir. 2012) (upholding a 2
U.S.C. § 441b prohibition on corporate contributions in federal elections); see also 2 U.S.C.
§ 441b(a) (2006), invalidated by Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
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At the system level, however, the reformer might discover unintended
consequences that result in a net loss of information overall despite the net
gains at the rule and regime level. It may turn out, for example, that much
of the corporate speech comes from individuals who otherwise would
support candidates directly. However, because of the chilling effect of the
disclosure of campaign contributions, they use organizational proxies that
additional disclosure may not reveal except at great cost in informational
tradeoff terms. For example, some of the individuals funding corporate
speech could be relatively wealthy and sufficiently sophisticated to conceal
themselves in a series of corporate shells like so many nested dolls. Others
could be of relatively modest means and are chilled from source disclosure
and therefore choose to contribute to the proxy rather than a candidate. In
such a situation, the reformer might actually improve the information
tradeoff by decreasing disclosure for candidate contributions through
increased thresholds or semi-disclosure,55 rather than by increasing
disclosure for corporate expenditures. The gain in information would be
particularly likely under the plausible assumption that one reason
individuals prefer to contribute to candidates rather than to corporations
making independent expenditures is that a dollar goes farther in funding
candidate speech; candidate campaigns may be more effective at express
advocacy, more efficient at using media, and more credible in delivering a
valued policy benefit.56
This model also has implications for judicial review. Take the judge
seeking to improve the information tradeoff consistent with a view that one
purpose of the First Amendment is to maximize the amount of information
available to speakers.57 The information tradeoff means, at least, that a judge
cannot necessarily expect that minimizing the chill of disclosure will
maximize the amount of information produced. Yet this position seems
close to that taken by Justice Thomas in his lone dissent from the disclosure
holding of Citizens United, in which he would have invalidated the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act’s (BCRA) disclosure requirements for electioneering
communications on their face.58 Conversely, a judge cannot necessarily
55. See Bruce Cain, Shade from the Glare: The Case for Semi-Disclosure, CATO UNBOUND (Nov. 8,
2010),
http://www.cato-unbound.org/2010/11/08/bruce-cain/shade-glare-case-semi-disclosure
(arguing for disclosure of sector-based information, but not personally identifying information, from
campaign contributors).
56. See Kang, supra note 34, at 44 (“Candidates and parties are likely to prefer
contributions over expenditures because contributions give them more control over the money
and the resulting speech. Even if independent expenditures are valuable to candidates and
parties, contributions are better dollar for dollar.”); see also id. at 47 (“[C]andidates and parties
ought to be the best spokespeople (or at least have the best incentives to enlist the best
spokespeople) for their candidacies.”).
57. Gilbert, supra note 3, at 1889–90.
58. Id. (criticizing Justice Thomas’s argument for facial invalidation of electioneering
communication disclosure requirements).
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expect that an attempt to maximize the amount of speech through
invalidation of campaign finance restrictions will necessarily increase the
amount of information available to voters. Less information may be an
unanticipated system effect of Citizens United, in which the majority
expressed a naïve faith in the “campaign finance system that pairs corporate
independent expenditures with effective disclosure” it thought it was
creating.59 The Court, in other words, saw its first-best constitutional ruling
undermined by its effects in a second-best campaign finance system.
Contrast both of these views with an earlier view adopted by the Court
in McConnell v. Federal Election Commission. There, the majority rooted
disclosure in traditional First Amendment values, asking “how ‘uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open’ speech can occur when organizations hide
themselves from the scrutiny of the voting public.”60 The Court found that
rather than reinforcing “precious First Amendment values,” invalidating
disclosure simply on the grounds that it may chill speech “ignores the
competing First Amendment interests of individual citizens seeking to make
informed choices in the political marketplace.”61 In another case
representing a sophisticated view of the system of campaign finance
disclosure, Justice Breyer explained a related tradeoff in the context of
campaign contributions: “this is a case where constitutionally protected
interests lie on both sides of the legal equation,” he argued, because some
laws can encourage, rather than chill, “the public participation and open
discussion that the First Amendment itself presupposes.”62 In the same case,
Justice Kennedy expressed a skeptical but similarly sophisticated recognition
of “the artificial system we have imposed.”63 This sensitivity to system effects
and the problem of adjudicating in a second-best world was notably absent
from his opinion for the majority in Citizens United.64

59. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 370.
60. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 196 (2003) (quoting McConnell v.
Fed. Election Comm’n, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 237 (D.D.C. 2003) (per curiam)), overruled in part
by Citizens United v. Fed. Electon Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
61. Id. at 97.
62. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 400–01 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring).
63. Id. at 410 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
64. A related debate over the system effects of public campaign financing recently took
place in the footnotes of Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806
(2011) (invalidating state public campaign finance law that matched candidate financing to the
private campaign expenditures of opposing candidates and independent groups). Compare id. at
2821 n.7 (“If the matching funds provision achieves its professed goal and causes candidates to
switch to public financing, there will be less speech: no spending above the initial state-set
amount by formerly privately financed candidates, and no associated matching funds for
anyone.” (internal citation omitted)), with id. at 2835 n.4 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“The majority
argues that more speech will quickly become ‘less speech,’ as candidates switch to public
funding. But that claim misunderstands how a voluntary public financing system works.
Candidates with significant financial resources will likely decline public funds, so that they can
spend in excess of the system’s expenditure caps. Other candidates accept public financing
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CONCLUSION
The current federal campaign finance system is nothing if not secondbest. It is rife with compromises and constraints emerging from decades of
interactions among Congress, the courts, enforcement agencies, and
increasingly sophisticated political players. Each actor’s strategy typically
seeks to maximize accrued net benefits in isolation. Even when all actors
agree on the maximand—here, plausibly, every actor may be said to seek to
make more information available to voters according to the logic of the
information tradeoff—system effects will complicate and potentially
undermine any one actor’s strategy across rules and regimes. Extended
across multiple actors with multiple strategies in a reiterative game of
legislation, innovation, enforcement, and invalidation, getting the
information tradeoff right may be next to impossible. Yet, as Professor
Gilbert urges, these complicated consequences are not necessarily
indeterminate, and careful assessment of disclosure’s dynamic effects can
move the debate forward.65 In the increasingly complex system of campaign
finance disclosure, precision in such an assessment will be critical but
elusive. Short of that assessment, everyone implicated in the information
tradeoff, especially legislators proposing campaign finance reform and
judges questioning it, might benefit by maximizing less. They should
consider settling for second best.

because they believe it will enhance their communication with voters. So the system continually
pushes toward more speech.” (internal citation omitted)).
65. Gilbert, supra note 3, at 1851.

